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Here we focus on the description of the mechanisms behind the process of information aggregation
and decision making, a basic step to understand emergent phenomena in society, such as trends,
information spreading or the wisdom of crowds. In many situations, agents choose between discrete
options. We analyze experimental data on binary opinion choices in humans. The data consists of
two separate experiments in which humans answer questions with a binary response, where one is
correct and the other is incorrect. The questions are answered without and with information on the
answers of some previous participants. We find that a Bayesian approach captures the probability of
choosing one of the answers. The influence of peers is uncorrelated with the difficulty of the question.
The data is inconsistent with Weber’s law, which states that the probability of choosing an option
depends on the proportion of previous answers choosing that option and not on the total number
of those answers. Last, the present Bayesian model fits reasonably well to the data as compared to
some other previously proposed functions although the latter sometime perform slightly better than
the Bayesian model. The asset of the present model is the simplicity and mechanistic explanation
of the behavior.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
The process of information aggregation in social sys-
tems gives rise to emergent phenomena like the wisdom
of crowds [1, 2]. In order to understand such phenom-
ena a quantitative understanding of the mechanisms by
which information is aggregated and used in opinion for-
mation and decision making is needed. In the case of the
wisdom of crowds, which refers to having a better esti-
mation of the solution to a question when the opinions
of multiple heterogeneous agents are aggregated, it has
been shown that social interaction can lead to misleading
estimations [3]. The issue of information aggregation is
a hot topic which is expected to give insights into the
solution of many societal problems. For example, 2014’s
World Economic Forum’s meeting has the title “Leverag-
ing collective intelligence for unprecedented challenges”.
Models of opinion dynamics are based on assumptions
on the decision making process on interacting individ-
uals. Simple decision making rules employed in these
models include proportional imitation (i.e., the rate of
the opinion conversion is proportional to the number of
peers possessing the different opinion), employed in the
voter model, majority rules (i.e., the same rate is a su-
perlinear function), thresholding rules (i.e., thresholding
function), reinforcement rules (i.e., adaptive function de-
pending on experiences of agents), and homophily rules
(i.e., similar individuals more likely interact) [4–6]. The
type of the employed decision making rule affects the pos-
sibility, final state, speed, and other dynamical phenom-
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ena of collective opinion formation. However, in physics
and even social sciences literature, justification of these
different types of models is at best based on a qualita-
tive assessment of human behavior. Beyond opinion dy-
namics, social dilemmas, which in many cases are based
on binary decision making, also offer an opportunity to
bridge theory to experiments [7, 8].
For animals in groups, recent work in this direction
has identified Bayesian inference as a mechanism behind
their collective behavior [9–21]. In humans, experimental
evidence of Bayesian inference has been provided in the
realm of perceptual and cognitive domains [22, 23]. Ef-
fects of Bayesian types of inference on collective behavior
have been investigated with the use of mathematical and
individual-based models [16, 24–29]. Toward quantita-
tive understanding of social decision making of humans,
the seminal experiment by Milgram and colleagues [30]
designed to assess the probability to stop by a group of
bystanders has recently been reproduced [31] whose re-
sults are fitted by a heuristic function. There are also
other recent studies attempting to fit Bayesian (see the
references above), evolutionary dynamical [32], and other
[33, 34] models to behavioral data. The wisdom of crowds
when interaction among participants is allowed is also a
target of recent experimental studies [3, 35, 36]. However,
a unifying quantitative framework to infer models of so-
cial decision making on the basis of behavioral data of
humans is still lacking and much preceded by accumulat-
ing modeling frameworks for social animals [11, 15, 17].
In the present study, we address the potential of the
Bayesian approach to explain human decision making un-
der social interaction. We focus on subjects answering
questions with binary options, one of which is correct.
This situation contrasts with that of the previous stud-
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FIG. 1: Bayesian inference and experimental data. We
plot the probability to report a correct answer A as a function
of nA − nB for various (nA, nB) pairs: (a) Data set D1, (b)
Data set D2. The circles correspond to the data. The solid
curves indicate the best fits of Eq. (3): (p, s) = (0.80, 0.75) in
(a) and (0.82, 0.87) in (b).
ies on the wisdom of crowds that allowed virtually real
values of answers [3, 35, 36]. We examine binary choices
because many options in nature are discrete, as exempli-
fied by voting, purchasing, and deciding where to live.
In many of such situations, extrapolation from continu-
ous settings is not obvious. We use previously published
data sets in which the participants first answer in the
absence of social information and later with the infor-
mation about the answers submitted by the r previous
respondents; r gradually increases for the same question
[33, 34]. The participants answer in a sequence, the sit-
uation akin to that for previous Bayesian models of the
emergence of herd behavior [24, 37]. We show that sim-
ple Bayesian models reasonably explain the behavioral
data.
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS
A. Model
We denote the two options of a question by A and B
Without loss of generality, we assume that A and B are
the correct and wrong answers of the question q, respec-
tively. We label the N agents 1, . . . , N and denote the
option that agent i (i = 1, . . . , N) selects in question q by
xi(q) ∈ {A,B}. We denote by P [xi(q) = A] the strength
of the belief (hereafter, simply the belief), with which
agent i believes in A. A parallel definition is applied to
P [xi(q) = B]. Note that P [xi(q) = A] , P [xi(q) = B] ≥
0, and P [xi(q) = A] + P [xi(q) = B] = 1.
We update the agent i’s belief as follows. We assume
that the answer of the previous respondent j, i.e., xj(q),
is generated according to the probability specified by the
belief of agent j, i.e., P [xj(q) = A], which equals 1 −
P [xj(q) = B]. Then, by using the Bayes’ theorem, agent
i is assumed to update the belief on the basis of the old
belief and xj(q). The posterior belief of agent i is given
by
P [xi(q) = A]post
=
P [xj(q) = A|xi(q) = A]P [xi(q) = A]pre∑
Xi=A,B
P [xj(q) = A|xi(q) = Xi]P [xi(q) = Xi]pre
=
cP [xi(q) = A]pre
cP [xi(q) = A]pre + (1− c)P [xi(q) = B]pre
, (1)
where P [xi(q) = A]pre and P [xi(q) = B]pre are prior
beliefs summing up to unity. Parameter c ≡
P [xj(q) = A|xi(q) = A] (1/2 ≤ c < 1) represents
the flexibility of agent i in response to agent j’s an-
swer. If c is close to unity, P [xj(q) = B|xi(q) = A] =
1 − c is small such that 1 − P [xi(q) = A]post, i.e.,
P [xi(q) = B]post is large once agent i observes xj(q) =
B for a given P [xi(q) = A]pre. If c is close to 1/2,
P [xi(q) = A]post is insensitive to xj(q). By symmetry,
we assumed that P [xj(q) = B|xi(q) = B] = c such that
P [xj(q) = A|xi(q) = B] = 1−P [xj(q) = B|xi(q) = B] =
1− c.
Iterative application of Eq. (1) leads to
P [xi(q) = A]
=
cnA−nBP0 [xi(q) = A]
cnA−nBP0 [xi(q) = A] + (1− c)nA−nB {1− P0 [xi(q) = A]}
(2)
and P [xi(q) = B] = 1 − P [xi(q) = A], where nA and
nB are the accumulated numbers of A and B responses
of the previous respondents observed by agent i, respec-
tively. The initial belief of agent i in option A is denoted
by P0 [xi(q) = A]. It should be noted that the order in
which the previous responses are observed does not af-
fect i’s behavior. The belief of each agent i is uniquely
determined by nA − nB and the initial belief. We can
rewrite Eq. (2) as
P [xi(q) = A] =
1
1 + psnA−nB
, (3)
where p = {1− P0 [xi(q) = A]} /P0 [xi(q) = A] and s =
(1 − c)/c. Previous studies used Eq. (3) to account for
consensus decision making by fish [38, 39].
B. Data set
In the present study, we use the two data sets collected
in Refs. [33, 34]. The first data set, which we denote by
D1, consists of two sets of face-to-face experiments [33].
Data set D1 consists of the results obtained from two
populations of subjects each of which contains N = 31
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FIG. 2: Dependence on the fraction of correct answers.
(a) Probability to answer correctly as a function of the frac-
tion of correct answers of the previous respondents for data
set D1. Black r = 1, red r = 2, green r = 3, blue r = 4, yellow
r = 7, and brown r = 9. (b) Same results for data set D2.
Black r = 1, red r = 5, green r = 11, and blue r = 21. (c)
Slope as a function of r obtained by the least square method
applied to the plots in panels (a) and (b). The closed and
open circles correspond to D1 and D2, respectively.
subjects (KUE-A and KUE-B in Ref. [33]). Each sub-
ject went through 100 questions. Each question allowed
binary options, one being correct and the other being
incorrect. Generally speaking, the subjects were asked
to answer each question more than once under different
information conditions. We refer to a sequence of an-
swering sessions under a given question q (1 ≤ q ≤ 100)
and information condition parameterized by r as a round.
Subjects went through several rounds for each question
in general.
The number of rounds that a subject experienced for
each question depends on the subject. The N subjects
in a population were randomly assigned labels 1, 2, . . .,
N . In the first round, all subjects answered the ques-
tion without referring to others’ responses. This is the
memoryless condition (r = 0). If everybody answered
within the allocated time, there were N data points for
each population and question.
The second round was implemented as follows. First,
subject 1 left this question without participating in the
second and following rounds. Second, subject 2 observed
the answer of subject 1 in the first round and possibly
updated the private answer. Similarly, subject i observed
subject (i − 1)’s answer in the first round and possibly
updated the answer, where i runs from i = 3 to i = N
in an ascending order. In the best case whereby every-
body answered, N − 1 data points were collected in the
second round. The collected data correspond to informa-
tion condition r = 1.
The third round, corresponding to r = 2, was imple-
mented as follows. First, subject 2 left without partici-
pating in the third and further rounds. Second, subject
3 observed the number of answers (nA, nB) submitted
most recently by the previous r = 2 respondents and an-
swered the question again. It should be noted that (nA,
nB)= (2, 0), (1, 1), or (0, 2). To calculate (nA, nB), the
answer of subject 1 in the first round and that of subject
2 in the second round were used. This is because subject
1 already left the question before the second round. In
other words, the answer of subject 1 is assumed to be
quenched to that made in the first round in the subse-
quent (i.e., second and later) rounds. Third, subject i
answered after observing (nA, nB) calculated on the ba-
sis of the most recent choice of subjects i − 1 and i − 2,
where i runs from 4 to N . There are at most N − 2
answers obtained from the third round.
After the third round was completed, further rounds
were carried out with r = 3, 5, 7, 9, and ∞ in this or-
der, where r = ∞ implies that the subjects can refer to
the most recent answers of all the preceding respondents.
Subject 3 had left before the fourth round, correspond-
ing to r = 3, started. Subjects 4 and 5 had left before
the fifth round, corresponding to r = 5, started. There
are eight rounds in total. The labels of the subjects were
fixed throughout the 100 questions.
The second data set, which we denote by D2, consists
of two sets of web-based experiments. They are denoted
by HUE-A and HUE-B in Ref. [33] and the O and C
treatments, corresponding to r = 0 and r > 0, respec-
tively, in Exp-II in Ref. [34]. Data set D2 consists of
the results obtained from two subject populations each
of which contains N = 52 subjects. Each subpopulation
of subjects went through 120 questions. In D2, each sub-
ject experienced up to 6 rounds, i.e., r = 0, 1, 5, 11, 21,
and∞ for each question. The labels of the subjects were
randomly shuffled in the beginning of each question.
III. RESULTS
Let us first consider the aggregate results for each ex-
periment. As described previously, a subject answers a
question after observing the number of the correct an-
swer, nA, and that of the incorrect answer, nB , from the
last r = nA + nB respondents. By the aggregate results
we mean that we aggregate the number of correct an-
swers across questions for the same condition (nA, nB).
We denote by R(nA, nB) the number of answers obtained
under condition (nA, nB), summed over respondents i
4and questions q. Out of these answers, the number of
answer A, denoted by NA(nA, nB), is given by
NA(nA, nB) =
∑
i,q
xi(q, nA, nB). (4)
The fraction of A answers under condition (nA, nB) is
given by NA(nA, nB)/R(nA, nB). This fraction for vari-
ous (nA, nB) pairs is plotted in Fig. 1(a) and 1(b) for D1
and D2, respectively. We fit P [xi = A] given by Eq. (3)
to the experimental data, where we suppress q in the ar-
gument of xi because we have aggregated the data over
the questions. We estimate the values of p and s by an
exhaustive sampling in the parameter space. For each
sampled (p, s) pair, we calculate the error by the total
square distance between Eq. (3) and the empirical values
summed over the available (nA, nB) pairs. The param-
eter values yielding the smallest error are adopted. The
results of the best fitting are shown by the solid curves in
Fig. 1(a) and 1(b) for D1 and D2, respectively. For D1,
the best fit is obtained for p = 0.81, s = 0.75 which lead
to a root mean squared error RMSE≈ 0.042. For D2,
we obtain p = 0.82, s = 0.87 leading to RMSE≈ 0.059.
Figure 1 indicates that Eq. (3) fits both data sets reason-
ably well. The value of the RMSE as a function of both
parameters is shown in Fig. 6.
An alternative hypothesis of collective decision mak-
ing is that P [xi = A] obeys Weber’s law such that it is a
function that only depends on (nA − nB)/(nA + nB), or
equivalently, nA/(nA+nB) [15, 17]. To test this hypoth-
esis, we aggregate the data over q and i using the same
aggregation as that used in Fig. 1, but separately for r to
examine the effect of r on the decision making, and plot
P [xi = A] as a function of nA/(nA+nB). The results are
shown in Fig. 2(a) and 2(b) for D1 and D2, respectively.
Each color corresponds to a value of r = nA+nB . If We-
ber’s law holds true, all curves collapse on a single curve.
Figure 2 indicates that it is not the case. To be more
quantitative, in Fig. 2(c), we plot the slope of the curves
obtained by applying the least square method to the data
shown in Fig. 2(a) and 2(b). The figure indicates that
the slope increases with r(= nA + nB) and seems to sat-
urate. That would mean that Weber’s law is correct for
sufficiently large r values. Nevertheless, for the r values
accessed by the experiment, Weber’s law does not hold.
With data for larger r values one could assess if Weber’s
law holds and from which r value on.
We have a reasonable fit of the data to Eq. (3) even
without aggregation over the questions. To show this,
for a given question, we calculate the fraction of the cor-
rect answers NqA(nA, nB)/R
q(nA, nB), where R
q(nA, nB)
is the number of answers to question q obtained under
condition (nA, nB), and N
q
A(nA, nB) ≡
∑
i xi(q, nA, nB)
is the corresponding number of answer A. The relation-
ship between P [xi(q) = A] and z = (nA−nB) ln sq+ln pq
for different questions is plotted in Fig. 3(a). If Eq. (3)
holds true, the results for different questions should col-
lapse on a single curve P [xi(q) = A] = [1 + exp(z)]
−1
shown by the solid line. The results for the different ques-
FIG. 3: Dependence on the question. (a) Probability of
correct answers as function of rescaled accumulated answers
of previous respondents (nA−nB) ln(s) + ln(p). Each symbol
represents a question. Black, open symbols correspond to D1,
and blue filled circles to D2. We estimated the s and p values
for each question by applying the least square method to the
data for the corresponding question. (b) Estimated p and s
values for different questions. The top and side panels show
the distributions of p and s, respectively.
tions do roughly collapse on this curve. The estimated
values of pq and sq for individual questions are shown in
Fig. 3(b). As before, we obtained parameter values pq
and sq by sampling the parameter space and finding the
values giving the smallest error. Figure 3(b) shows that
the estimated parameter values depend on the question
to a large extent. For some questions, p > 1, implying
that the initial belief in the correct answer is worse than
the random coin flip, i.e., P0 [xi(q) = A] < 0.5. For a
majority of questions, however, the initial belief is bet-
ter than the random coin flip, and for some questions,
it is quite accurate (for example, p = 0.1 corresponds to
P0 [xi(q) = A] = 0.91). Another remark is that p and s
are apparently uncorrelated. This implies that the flexi-
bility of the opinion change does not depend on the dif-
ficulty of the question.
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FIG. 4: Testing different models for data set D1. (a)
P [A] = δnA/(δnA+δnB ), δ = 1.33, RMSE = 0.06, (b) P [A] =
(δ+nA)
/[(δ+nA)
+(δ+nB)
], δ = 3.90,  = 1.95, RMSE =
0.05, (c) P [A] = (δ+nA)/[1+(nA+nB)], δ = 0.63,  = 0.41,
RMSE = 0.03, (d) P [A] = 1/2 + δ(nA − nB)/(nA + nB + ),
δ = 0.68,  = 5.06, RMSE = 0.06, (e) P [A] = [1 + (1 +
δ−nA)/(1 + δ−nB )]−1, δ = 8.32,  = 1.60, RMSE = 0.05, (f)
P [A] = (1 + psnA−nB )−1, p = 0.81, s = 0.75, RMSE = 0.04.
The different colors correspond to nB = 0 (black), 1 (red), 2
(green), 3 (blue), 4 (yellow), 5 (brown), 6 (grey), 7 (violet).
In the literature one can find different models that pro-
pose different functional forms for P [A|nA, nB ]. Follow-
ing [17], we fitted several of them [17, 39–42] to the cur-
rent data. The quality of fitting is shown in Figs. 4 and
5 for data sets D1 and D2, respectively, in different col-
ors for different values of nB . For D1, the best results
are produced with the model in Ref. [42] with a RMSE
≈ 0.035, followed closely by the model presented in this
paper (RMSE ≈ 0.042). For D2, the best fitting (RMSE
≈ 0.046) is produced with the model in Ref. [42], and
followed closely by the models in Refs. [40, 41] (RMSE
≈ 0.053) and Ref. [17] (RMSE ≈ 0.054), with none of
them being the one in this paper. See Table I for more
information.
It should be noted that the first model in Table I is
equivalent to a special case of our model (i.e., p = 1).
Therefore, the fitting cannot be better than the present
model. Note also that we fitted the model in Ref. [17]
with k = 0. The result of fitting with k as a free param-
eter gives rise to very small values of k (k = 0.04 for D1
and k = 0.065 for D2), in the order of 10
−2. The param-
eter  is insensitive to the small value of k being different
to 0 ( = 1.60 for D1 and  = 1.30 for D2), while pa-
rameter δ is a much more sensitive (δ = 7.04 for D1 and
δ = 8.72 for D2) (compare to results in Table I), as the
minimum in the optimization is flatter in the direction of
the δ parameter, as happens also for parameter p in the
present model (see Fig.6). The quality of the fittings is
of the same order as when using k = 0 (RMSE = 0.054
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FIG. 5: Testing different models for data set D2. (a)
P [A] = δnA/(δnA+δnB ), δ = 1.15, RMSE = 0.07, (b) P [A] =
(δ+nA)
/[(δ+nA)
+(δ+nB)
], δ = 3.66,  = 1.52, RMSE =
0.05, (c) P [A] = (δ+nA)/[1+(nA+nB)], δ = 0.62,  = 0.35,
RMSE = 0.05, (d) P [A] = 1/2 + δ(nA − nB)/(nA + nB + ),
δ = 0.57,  = 4.39, RMSE = 0.06, (e) P [A] = [1 + (1 +
δ−nA)/(1 + δ−nB )]−1, δ = 12.01,  = 1.30, RMSE = 0.05,
(f) P [A] = (1 + psnA−nB )−1, p = 0.82, s = 0.87, RMSE
= 0.06. The different colors correspond to nB = 0 (black), 1
(red), 2 (green), 3 (blue), 4 (yellow), 5 (brown), 6 (grey), 7
(violet), 8 (cyan), 9 (pink).
for D1 and RMSE = 0.054 for D2). This also happens
for the zebrafish data in Ref. [17].
IV. DISCUSSION
We showed that the simple Bayesian model provides a
quantitative agreement with behavioral data of humans
sequentially answering questions with binary options. At
least two other studies used the same model as ours to be
fit to data in different contexts. In Ref. [39], sequential
choices by fish between two identical refugia are mod-
eled. Depending on whether the two refugia are identical
or nonidentical (i.e., only one arm was with a replica
predator), the unbiased prior (p = 1 in our notation)
or a biased one (p 6= 1) is used, respectively. In both
unbiased and biased prior cases, the authors concluded
s ≈ 0.4 (and the results are robust for 0.25 ≤ s ≤ 0.5),
translating into c = 1/(s + 1) ≈ 0.7 in our notation. In
another experiment with a different fish species, where
fish individuals chose one of the two arms of a maze to
avoid replica predators, Ward and colleagues [38] esti-
mated s ≈ 1/e0.478 ≈ 0.62, translating into c ≈ 0.62.
In contrast, our results indicate s ≈ 0.7− 0.8 and hence
c ≈ 0.56−0.59. This difference may result from different
species; humans may have lower responsitivity to social
stimuli (i.e., c value closer to 0.5) than fish (see Ref. [32]
for related experiments). The type of the task may also
6FIG. 6: Parameter estimation. Root mean squared error
associated to the fitting of the model given by Eq. eq:final to
datasets (a) D1 and (b) D2. The contour line shows a level
of 0.05 and 0.07 in (a) and (b), respectively.
contribute to this difference. In the current study, the
data set used are quizzes asking general knowledge of the
participants. By contrast, in the fish experiments, the
binary choice between two pathways that were identical
except for the possible presence of a replicator predator
was made by fish.
Quantitatively, some models fit better to our data than
the present model does, in particular for data set D2 (Ta-
ble I). However, it should be noted that some of these
previous models were proposed as fits, without particu-
lar mechanistic derivation [40–42]. Another model, i.e.,
the fourth model in Table I [17], which results from the
Taylor expansion of the model proposed in Ref. [15], has
mechanistic underpinning. However, the model is derived
from ant’s random walk on a specific arena [15]. In par-
ticular, the exit point that corresponds to the decision
of one of the two alternatives is literally the spatial exit
point of the animal. That may be why this model [15, 17]
does not fit well to the present data. Compared to Ar-
ganda’s model [17] (fifth model in Table I), the present
model fits better to data set D1 and worse to D2.
A way to differentiate between models is to have data
on the behavior for large number of information sources
(large r). In that limit the different models provide dif-
ferent functional forms for P [x = A]. Therefore, the
models from Table I give rise to different limits r → ∞.
The first and the last one (model used in this paper) give
rise to a step function. The second model converges to
x/(x+(1−x)), where x is the fraction of A responses,
which coincides with Weber’s law for  = 1. However,
the values of  estimated for our data are much larger
than unity. The third function for large r approximates
the fraction of A responses. The fourth function gives
1/2 + δ(2x − 1), which is a good approximation of the
previous model given that the fitting parameter δ ' 1/2
for our datasets. The fifth model gives a constant value
P [x = A] = 1/2 in the limit r →∞. More experimental
data for large r would enable the further validation of
models.
There are some limitations of the present study. First,
we ignored the individuality of the respondents. In fact,
for each question, there should be those who know the
correct answer and those who do not. Such personal
knowledge can be incorporated to models for sequential
answering [24, 33]. Clarifying this issue warrants future
work. Second, we tried to incorporate the information
about the previous responses into our model. However,
the design of the experiment makes it difficult to cope
with this issue. The answers offered to subject i in each
round are not a random sample from the pool of re-
sponses in the previous round, but are the responses of
the previous respondents i−1, i−2, ..., i−r as initially la-
beled, which represents a biased sampling. Together with
the influence of the history of self-responses on the new
decision, these features affect the decision making process
of the subjects and thus the evolution of the fraction of
correct answers. Indeed in many situations individuals
are not making decision from a tabula rasa but they are
shaping decisions continuously from social interactions
and external signals. Future developments of the theory
are expected to incorporate these ingredients to deal with
more realistic situations. Besides, large scale experiments
taking advantage of the new technologies available would
be welcome to confront with decision making theories.
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